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I. INTRODUCTION

It has been oft-written that the international society is undergoing a
series of important structural and cultural changes. For international jurists, these modifications can be cast as a threefold expansion: expansion
of the scope of international law with the creation and development of
important regulatory frameworks, leading to an increase of the normative
prescriptions of international law;' a strengthening and multiplication of
the enforcement mechanisms of the norms of international law;2 and
both a quantitative and qualitative expansion of the actors of the international society who seek the support of international norms to validate
their claims or their participation.'
With this threefold transformation, the volume of social transactions
regulated internationally or transnationally has undoubtedly grown. As a
logical corollary, one can expect an increase of the risks of frictions
among various normative frameworks, enforcement bodies, and actors of
the international society. This Article aims at examining an instance of
such clash between two regulatory frameworks whose application scope
partly overlaps and whose clash therefore calls for resolution: it deals
with the recognition of Cuba-originating intellectual property (IP) rights
in the United States.4 The two regulatory frameworks that will be exam1.
See Vaughan Lowe, The Politics of Law-Making: Are the Method and Character of
Norm Creation Changing?, in THE ROLE OF LAW IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS 207 (Michael
Byers ed., 2000) (arguing that the international legal system has matured so that its architecture has reached the point of completeness).
2.
See generally Cesare P.R. Romano, The Proliferation of International Judicial Bodies: The Pieces of the Puzzle, 31 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 710 (1999); Georges Abi-Saab,
Fragmentation or Unification: Some Concluding Remarks, 31 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 919
(1999); Jonathan 1.Charney, Is International Law Threatened by Multiple International Tribunals?, 271 RECUEIL DES COURS 101 (1998); see also Gilbert Guillaume, President of the
International Court of Justice, The Proliferation of International Judicial Bodies: The Outlook
for the International Legal Order, Speech delivered to the Sixth Commission of the General
Assembly of the United Nations (Oct. 27, 2000), available at http://www.icjcij.org/icjwww/ipresscom/SPEECHES/iSpeechPresident-Guillaume-SixthCommittee-20001
027.htm.
3.
See generally JAMES N. ROSENAU, TURBULENCE IN WORLD POLITICS: A THEORY OF
CHANGE AND CONTINUITY (1990); Benedict Kingsbury, Claims by Non-State Groups in International Law, 25 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 481 (1992). On the increased role of NGOs as
"norms entrepreneurs," see Martha Finnemore & Kathryn Sikkink, International Norm Dynamics and Political Change, 52 INT'L ORG. 887 (1998).
4.
The expression "Cuba-originating IP right" is used throughout this Article to refer
to an IP right originally created in Cuba the use or protection of which is sought in the United
States. Apart from the obvious link to Cuba, the expression should be understood as attaching
two other defining conditions to an IP fight created in Cuba, (1) confiscation of the IP fight in
Cuba by the Cuban government on or after January 1, 1959, and (2) registration of the IP right
in the United States, or a reputation such that it qualifies as a well-known mark. A second
important terminological point is that I write of both trademarks and IP rights. I do not seek
thereby to broaden the scope of the topic under study, which is focused on trademarks. Given
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ined in this Article are (1) the U.S. embargo imposed on Cuba and more
specifically the measures dealing with the exercise of confiscated IP
rights in the United States, and (2) the international IP regime which is
part of the World Trade Organization (WTO) framework, namely the
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property (TRIPS
Agreement).5 In order to be more concrete, this Article will discuss in
detail the decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit in the Havana Club case,6 as well as the Section 211 of the Omnibus AppropriationAct holding of the Appellate Body of the WTO.7
This Article examines the clash of the two regulatory frameworks
from the angle of distributive justice. By doing so, I suggest that in addition to the important issues of legitimacy, substantive norms, and
hierarchy of legal orders, clashes between potential regulatory frameworks should also be conceptualized in the way in which they allocate
goods (here the rights associated with IP) or recognize claims to or interests in such goods. The reasons for being concerned with distributive
justice are threefold.
First, from a larger standpoint, questions of distributive justice are often disregarded in international law. Despite this condemnable attitudearguably taking root either in an underlying universalist vision simplifying
distributive issues to a question of formal equality, in a disregard for the
impact of structural interdependence of economic agents, or in a belief
that States appropriately delimit the boundaries of distribution 8distributive justice issues are an important and complex dimension of the
international society and of its legal system. The past three decades of the
twentieth century have produced a few serious and rich disquisitions on
distributive justice from which international jurists seem to have drawn

that some principles are common to trademarks and other forms of IP rights, I have sometimes
chosen to retain the more general and encompassing category without claiming that my arguments or conclusions dealing with trademarks should be automatically extended to other types
of IP rights.
5.
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994,
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex IC, LEGAL INSTRUMENTS-RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND vol. 31, 33 I.L.M. 81 [hereinafter TRIPS
Agreement].
6.
Havana Club Holding v. Galleon, 203 F.3d 116 (2d Cir. 2000).

7.

WTO Appellate Body Report, United States-Section 211 Omnibus Appropriation

Act of 1998, WT/DSI76/AB/R (Jan. 2, 2002), available at http://www.wto.org (last visited
Apr. 21, 2003) [hereinafter Section 211 OAA Appellate Body Report].
8.
For views trying to overcome this stasis, see generally CHARLES R. BEITZ, POLITICAL THEORY AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS (1979); Thomas W. Pogge, Prioritiesof Global
Justice, 32 METAPHILOSOPHY 6 (2001); Andrew Hurrell, Global Inequality and International
Institutions, 32 METAPHILOSOPHY 34 (2001).
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little.9 In the context of regime formation,1° it is doubtless that distributive concerns shape the too-little unwrapped notion of "State interest." It
is not imprudent to posit that, generally, people involved in the formation
of an international regime will seek to design a framework which is a
function of two objectives: a purely distributive objective, often the preservation or maximization of the "national" wealth (which can be
identified or located according to different principles), and an aggregative objective, that is, a concern for the facilitation of the overall
production and exchange of goods." The origins of a given regulatory
framework, its substantive principles, and its use by various actors are all
a result or by-product of tensions between distributive and aggregative
claims, as well as among various distributive claims.
Second, given that the regimes at study here directly deal with property rights, the question of allocation of those rights among social actors
who formulate a claim to them is rather immediate. By expanding or
limiting the recognition or exercise of IP rights, the two regimes at stake
are primarily endowed with a distributive function.' 2

9.
Apart from Beitz's above-cited contribution in the field of international relations,
see generally THOMAS W. POGGE, WORLD POVERTY AND HUMAN RIGHTS (2002); MICHAEL
WALZER, THICK AND THIN (1994); JOHN RAWLS, THE LAW OF PEOPLES (1999).
10.
I often use the label "regime" to qualify the two regulatory frameworks studied
here. It is relatively safe to assert that the WTO or TRIPS Agreement fits the definition of an
international regime, as understood in the international relations literature. See Stephen D.
Krasner, Structural Causes and Regime Consequences: Regimes as Intervening Variables, 36
INT'L ORG. 185, 185 (1982) (defining "international regime" as a set of "principles, norms,
rules, and decision-making procedures around which actor expectations converge in a given
issue-area"). The same is not true however of the U.S. embargo against Cuba. First, its qualification as an "international" regime is more problematic given its purely domestic legislative
origin and judicial enforcement mechanism. However, given the extraterritorial jurisdiction
claimed under such regime, it purports to enable and constrain actors acting internationally or
transnationally and can loosely fit the category of an international regime. More problematic
still is that regimes are essentially social enterprises of cooperation, which is not a priori
compatible with the unilateral imposition of extraterritorial measures. See Robert 0. Keohane,
International Institutions: Two Approaches, 32 INT'L STUD. Q. 379 (1988). With that in mind,
I keep using the term generically to describe both regulatory frameworks and concede that the
U.S. embargo hardly constitutes a cooperative framework regulating interaction. In other
words, I use "regime" concededly loosely here-especially with respect to the rules establishing the Cuban embargo-more as signifying a normative framework creating (or limiting)
rights, obligations, and other legal prerogatives, which shape expectations of actors, than as
the result of a collaborative enterprise among States.
II.
See AMARTYA SEN, EQUALITY REEXAMINED 136 (1992).
12.
It seems that in the context of recognition or extension of rights to non-nationals,
there is a form of central distribution taking place which literally creates (through expansion)
entitlements and claims. The regimes at stake here therefore do not merely serve the purpose
of justifying holdings from an individual's perspective, but genuinely "distribute" rights in the

sense of allotting or apportioning them. See ROBERT

NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE AND UTOPIA

149 (1974), for an argument on the misconception of the problem of distributive justice on the
ground of the absence of a central distribution of goods.
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Third, apart from being an essential defining feature of the regimes
under study, the distributive principles of the various regimes can also
influence or guide the behavior of various actors in the formulation of a
claim to a good distributed by the regimes. Indeed, those actors will pay
heed to the differences in the potentially applicable distributive schemes
and will exploit those differences to foster their interests, either by using
the most effective remedies or by squarely placing themselves in a new
position so as to be able to formulate a claim. In the latter sense, plurality of not wholly isomorphous distributive schemes can even contribute
to the generation of clashes by inducing actors who see an advantage in
doing so to position themselves differently so as to gain from the existence and enforcement of another regime.
Before focusing on the relevant regulatory frameworks and on their
clash, an important point should be made. One could dismiss at the outset the importance or relevance of the analysis herein contained on the
basis that what we are dealing with is not a case of incompatibility of
regulatory frameworks, but rather one of primacy of legal order. In other
words, the relevant question to ask is which of the domestic or the international legal orders trumps the other. The question should be answered
on the basis of arguments in favor of monism or, on the contrary, on the
basis of a dualist approach to the construction of legal orders, allowing
for unsolved inconsistencies between the prescriptions of the international and the domestic legal orders. But this is a rather unsatisfactory
approach to the problem at stake. First, it seeks the solution of the question on theoretical grounds whereas legal orders are essentially social
constructs, the clashes of which are contextual. Secondly, the U.S. embargo against Cuba does not neatly fit the classification as a domestic
regime. It seeks to regulate the legal impact in the United States of expropriation policies of a foreign government. As a regime aiming at the
regulation of the domestic consequences of "foreign" acts, it is therefore
at best a semi-domestic regime or, more convincingly, a hybrid regime
pertaining concurrently to the international and the domestic legal orders. Under international law, a State can take measures against another
State as a form of reprisal for an internationally wrongful act. 3 Similarly,
13.

Draft Articles on Responsibility of States of Internationally Wrongful Acts, U.N.

GAOR, Int'l Law Comm'n, 52d Sess., arts. 22, 49, 51, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/L.600 (2000), reprinted in Report of the InternationalLow Commission on the Work of Its Fifty-third Session,
U.N. GAOR, 56th Sess., Supp. No. 10, at 43, U.N. Doc. A/56/10 (2001), available at
http://www.un.org/law/ilc. There is an inconclusive precedent involving an embargo challenged on the ground of its incompatibility with the obligations undertaken in the GATT: the
U.S. embargo against Nicaragua defended on national security grounds. The GATT panel

decision-which stated the incapacity of the panel to find the United States either in violation
of or in compliance with its obligation under the GATT-was never adopted. GATT Dispute

Panel Report, United States-Trade Measures Affecting Nicaragua (Unadopted), L/6053 (Oct.

Michigan Journalof InternationalLaw

[Vol. 24:767

the TRIPS Agreement, if international in its source, is also hybrid in that
it is not an autonomous and complete regulatory framework. It needs the
support of domestic regulatory frameworks and institutions. 4 There is
therefore no real clash of order, but rather a question of coordination of
regimes, which recognize prerogatives of varying intensity, according to
the identity of the claimant. Thirdly, and more importantly for the sake
of this Article, the question of how to solve the clash of regimes is not
the one mainly addressed here. The thrust of the Article deals with where
or how, in their distributive dimensions, the regimes under study differ,
and seeks to adumbrate an answer as to why this is so. The question of
how to resolve the clash of regimes is therefore subordinate to, or at least
on a different level from, the ones explored here.
The next two Parts take a functional look at the inner workings and
the interplay of both regimes. Part II first describes their origins and
summarizes their core working principles and Part III then illustrates and
analyzes their clash through a discussion of the Havana Club and
Section 211 of the Omnibus Appropriation Act cases. In the last two
Parts, I tackle more directly the distributive structure of the regimes.
First, Part IV analyzes the two regimes in terms of various distributive
axes. Second, Part V proposes that mobility of actors and transaction
flux between zones corresponding to the respective spheres of
application of given regimes also bear a distributive impact and should
be integrated as a central feature of global distributive justice issues and
as a relevant element of analysis of how multiple international regulatory
frameworks can be used.
II. ORIGINS AND MAIN WORKING PRINCIPLES
OF THE TwO REGIMES

Under U.S. law, there are two ways to acquire a trademark or trade
name: by registration, in conformity with statutory requirements, or on
common law ground, through use. The requirements for registration and
13, 1986), available at 1986 WL 363154. See also John A. Spanogle, Jr., Can Helms-Burton
Be Challenged Under WTO?, 27 STETSON L. REV. 1313, 1329-30 (1998).
14.
On this point, Vincent Chiappetta argues:
TRIPS does not create single, unified "international" IPRs. The IP "owner" still ob-

tains a collection of locally enforceable IPRs, one from each jurisdiction. Standing
alone, requiring stronger independent national IPRs in every WTO member country
therefore enhances both the holder's portfolio of parallel national rights and the related ability to use them to restrict the free flow of IP-related goods in the

worldwide market.
Vincent Chiappetta, The Desirability ofAgreeing to Disagree: The WTO, TRIPS, International
IPR Exhaustion and a Few Other Things, 21 MICH. J. INT'L L. 333, 345 (2000).
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the rights thus conferred are set forth in the Trademark Act of 1946
(Lanham Act).' 5 Similar protection is granted to trademarks and trade
names acquired through use, although registration confers significant
evidentiary advantages (presumption of validity of the mark, presumption of ownership of the mark by the registrant, evidence of "intent to
use").' 6 Moreover, section 44 of the Lanham Act provides the procedural
vehicle for foreign corporations or persons to claim treaty-created or
treaty-recognized rights in the United States.'7 With those preliminary
remarks in mind, a more specific introduction to both regimes at stake
can now be made.
A. The Cuban Embargo
The origin of the specific regime governing Cuba-originating IP
rights cannot be understood if read out of the more general context of the
U.S. embargo against Cuba. There are three important moments in the
creation of the U.S. regime pertaining to transfers of rights of Cuban
nationals. First, the embargo against Cuba was imposed in 1963 by
President Kennedy and aimed, among other things, at countering the
effects of the nationalizing policies of the Cuban government. The
embargo was originally embodied in the Cuban Asset Control
Regulations (CACR), or Part 515 of the Code of Federal Regulation.' 9

15.

16.
17.

Trademark Act of 1946 (Lanham Act), 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1127 (2000).
Id. §§ 1057(b), 1115(a).
The Lanham Act reads in relevant part:

(b) Any person whose country of origin is a party to any convention or treaty relating to trademarks, trade or commercial names, or the repression of unfair

competition, to which the United States is also a party, or extends reciprocal rights
to nationals of the United States by law, shall be entitled to the benefits of this section under the conditions expressed herein to the extent necessary to give effect to
any provision of such convention, treaty or reciprocal law, in addition to the rights
to which any owner of a mark is otherwise entitled by this chapter.

(e) A mark duly registered in the country of origin of the foreign applicant may be
registered on the principal register if eligible, otherwise on the supplemental register in this chapter provided. Such applicant shall submit, within such time period as

may be prescribed by the Director, a certification or a certified copy of the registration in the country of origin of the applicant. The application must state the
applicant's bona fide intention to use the mark in commerce, but use in commerce
shall not be required prior to registration.

Lanham Act § 44.
See Proclamation No. 3447, 3 C.F.R. § 157 (1959-1963), reprinted in 22 U.S.C.
18.
§ 2370 (2000).
19.
Cuban Asset Control Regulations (CACR), 31 C.F.R. §§ 515.101-901 (2002) (as
amended). The president's authority to decide on the imposition of the embargo enacted in the
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Section 515.527 permits the obtainment of general and special licenses
for the registration and renewal, in the United States, of trademarks in
which Cuban nationals or the Cuban government have an interest,
despite the act of confiscation by the Cuban government." The Office of
Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) 2' was responsible for the administration
of the CACR and therefore for the granting of licenses.
Second, the embargo was strengthened and codified into law by the
Congress in 1996.22 The 1996 LIBERTAD Act, also known as the HelmsBurton Act, provided that people trafficking property confiscated by the
Cuban government on or after January 1, 1959 can be held liable if the
owner of the claim to such property is a U.S. national. It contains extraterritorial measures such as sanctions for foreign corporations doing
business involving expropriated assets in Cuba, which are hotly disputed
by the main economic partners of the United States.
Third, Congress enacted in 1999 the Omnibus Appropriation Act
(OAA) which contains measures specific to the recognition and enforcement of trademarks, trade names and commercial names
confiscated by the Cuban government. More specifically, section 211 of
the OAA contains preclusions susceptible of affecting the IP rights (or
claims) of non-U.S. corporations or citizens. Paragraph (a)(1) of section
211 precludes the obtainment of an authorization of a transfer of specific
rights (marks, commercial names, and trade names) confiscated during
the Cuban revolution "unless the original owner of the [right], or the

CACR rested in section 5(b) of the Trading with the Enemy Act of 1917, 12 U.S.C. § 95a

(2000) (as amended).
20.
"Transactions related to the registration and renewal in the United States Patent and
Trademark Office ...in which ... a Cuban national has an interest are authorized." 31 C.F.R

§ 515.527(a)(1) (2002).
21.

OFAC is the administrative agency to which the presidential powers of administra-

tion of the CACR have been delegated.
22.

Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (LIBERTAD) Act of 1996 (Helms-Burton

Act), 22 U.S.C. §§ 6021-6091 (2000). It has been argued that the Clinton Administration's
leniency with respect to the Cuban embargo motivated Congress's adoption of the LIBERTAD
Act. Dale L. Carlson et al., Trapped by TRIPS? IntellectualProperty Rights, the Cold War,and
the Cuban Embargo Revisited, 21 QUINNIPIAc L. REV. 43, 48 (2001).
23.
22 U.S.C. § 6082.
24.
Id. §§ 6081-6085; see also Bernadette Atuahene, The Effectiveness of International
Legislative Responses to the Helms-Burton Act, 69 REV. JUR. U.P.R. 809 (2000); Muriel van
den Berg, The Cuban Liberty and DemocraticSolidarity Act: Violations of InternationalLaw
and the Response of Key American Trade Partners,21 MD. J. INT'L L. & TRADE 279 (1997).
25.
Omnibus Consolidated and Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act of 1999
(OAA), Pub. L. 105-277, 112 Stat. 2681 (1998) (codified as amended in scattered sections of
U.S.C.). The meaning of "confiscated" refers to uncompensated nationalization, expropriation,

or seizure of property by the Cuban government on or after January 1, 1959 or to failure by
the same government to pay debts incurred in relation to nationalized, expropriated or seized
property on or after the same date. CACR, 31 C.F.R. § 515.336 (2002).
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bona fide successor-in-interest has expressly consented [thereto]., 26 Furthermore, section 211 of the OAA precludes courts from recognizing the
enjoyment of those specific rights, claimed under common law or by
virtue of regitration (paragraph (a)(2))27 or asserted under a treaty
through article 44 of the Lanham Act (paragraph (b)). 8 In the latter case,
getting the consent of the original owner or of his bona fide successor-ininterest
permits the bypass of the nonrecognition or nonenforcement pol9
2

icy.

The preclusions targeting court action (contained in paragraphs
(a)(2) and (b)) are measures that apply to "designated nationals." The
term "designated national," according to paragraph (d)(1) of section 211
of the OAA, "includes a national of any foreign country who is a successor-in-interest to a designated national "3' ° the latter being defined under
section 515.305 of the Code of Federal Regulations and referring to
Cuba, a national of Cuba or a specially designated national.' Section
not otherwise qualifying as
211(b) also applies to successors-in-interest
32
"designated nationals."
B. TRIPS Agreement

The international regime dealing with IP is the product of littleintegrated developments that took place over a long period. Since the
26.

The full text of the provision reads:

Notwithstanding any other provision of law, no transaction or payment shall be authorized or approved pursuant to section 515.527 of title 31, Code of Federal
Regulations, as in effect on September 9, 1998, with respect to a mark, trade name,
or commercial name that was used in connection with a business or assets that were
confiscated unless the original owner of the mark, trade name, or commercial name,
or the bona fide successor-in-interest has expressly consented.
OAA § 21 l(a)(1).
"No U.S. court shall recognize, enforce or otherwise validate any assertion of rights
27.
by a designated national based on common law rights or registration obtained under such
section 515.527 of such aconfiscated mark, trade name, or commercial name." Id. § 211 (a)(2).
The full text of subsection (b) reads:
28.
No U.S. court shall recognize, enforce or otherwise validate any assertion of treaty
rights by a designated national or its successor-in-interest under section 44 (b) or
(e) of the Trademark Act of 1946 (15 U.S.C. 1126 (b) or (e)) for a mark, trade
name, or commercial name that is the same or substantially similar to a mark, trade
name, or commercial name that was used in connection with a business or assets
that were confiscated unless the original owner of such mark, trade name, or commercial name, or the bona fide successor-in-interest has expressly consented.
Id. § 211 (b).
Id.
29.
30.
Id. § 211 (d)(1).
CACR, 31 C.F.R. § 515.305 (2002).
31.
OAA § 211 (b).
32.
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end of the nineteenth century, many international conventions dealing
with the protection of various types of IP rights have been signed,33 but
even their aggregation failed to form a coherent framework. Variations in
material and geographical scope of the many conventions, the general
lack of enforcement possibilities, and the actual leeway enjoyed by
States in adopting IP-protective measures explain why the loose constellation of instruments failed to qualify as a coherent regime.34 As for the
international trade regime, the GATT system was virtually silent on IP
rights and provided no real system of protection.35
The constitution of a more integrated international IP framework is a
product of the Uruguay Round.36 In order to secure strengthened international recognition and protection of IP rights, notably given their
growing economic importance,37 developed countries insisted that the
question of the protection of IP rights be linked with international trade
issues during the Uruguay Round. The mere inclusion of IP rights as an
item on the agenda of international trade negotiations encountered resistance.3 9 But the determination to conduct serious negotiations on the
33.
The list of those conventions is rather long and deals with a wide range of IP types,
and it would be vain to undertake a listing here. For a compendium of the main texts, see
PAUL GOLDSTEIN, INTERNATIONAL LEGAL MATERIALS ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY (2002).
34.
Frederick M. Abbott, writing in 1989, argued:
The international treaty system, while providing minimum substantive standards in
a few intellectual property rights areas, does not presently operate as an effective
substantive rule-making system, nor does it meaningfully address domestic enforcement procedures. These matters are presently reserved to the internal legal
systems of individual states, and as such substantial disparities prevail in substantive rules, enforcement procedures, and enforcement practices.
Frederick M. Abbott, Protecting First World Assets in the Third World: Intellectual Property
Negotiations in the GA7T Multilateral Framework, 22 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 689, 706
(1989).
35.
Article XX(d) of the GATT permitted States to adopt domestic measures protective
of IP rights, to the extent that they were not inconsistent with other GATT provisions. General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, art. XX(d), 61 Stat. A-1l , T.I.A.S. 1700, 55
U.N.T.S. 194. It did not create norms of obligations as to the extraterritorial protection of IP
rights. Abbott, supra note 34, at 696. For a review of the IP international conventions and the
GATT history, see BERNARD M. HOEKMAN & MICHEL M. KOSTECKI, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM: THE

WTO

AND BEYOND

280-83 (2d ed. 2001).

36.
see

For useful exposds on the conception and birth process of the TRIPS Agreement,
DANIEL GERVAIS, THE TRIPS AGREEMENT: DRAFTING HISTORY AND ANALYSIS (1998);

DUNCAN MATTHEWS, GLOBALISING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS

(2002).

37.
The combination of the growth of the significance of technology for industrialized
economies and of the increasing importance of international trade account for the formation of
such interest. Abbott, supra note 34, at 696; HOEKMAN & KOSTECKI, supra note 35, at 277.
38.
For a discussion of the available "packages of concessions" during the negotiations,
see Abbott, supra note 34, at 739-42.
39.
Amadou Tankoano, L'accord relatif aux aspects des droits de proprigtj intellectuelle lids au commerce (TRIPS), 20 INT'L TRADE L. & PRAC. 428, 431 (1994) (describing
U.S. resistance during the Ministerial Conference at Punta del Este).
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issue and to shove it down the recalcitrant States' throat if necessary was
strong-it even led to the adoption of unilateral (aggressive) commercial
measures by the United States.4" Finally, trade and IP were both on the
negotiating table during the Uruguay Round, which allowed some tradeoffs. 4 The negotiations resulted in the TRIPS Agreement.
Therathr
TRIPS
Agreement
ofpostive"
• is42not an instrument of harmonization, but
rather of positive integration: it imposes upon States the obligation to
enact a domestic system of IP protection, with different rules applying to
different types of IP rights. Given the wide spectrum of IP rights covered
by the TRIPS Agreement, this aspect is in itself a substantial expansion
of the legal protection of IP rights. Coupled with this obligation, three
general obligations provided under the TRIPS Agreement form the cornerstone of the international IP regime: the national treatment principle,
a most-favored nation (MFN) clause, and a transparency obligation.43
The first two principles, set respectively under articles 3 and 4, can be
conceived of as constituting a nondiscrimination policy." It is noteworthy that the national treatment principle attaches to persons rather than to
the goods.45 As for the MFN clause, it is an innovation in international IP
40.
The U.S. Congress took steps toward imposing unilateral measures to obtain greater
protection. Under section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974, the U.S. President was already authorized to limit the imports from a country whose commercial practices are deemed unfair or
unreasonable toward the United States. 19 U.S.C. § 2411 (2000) (as amended). In 1984, inadequate protection of IP was added to the list of violations of trade laws for which the
president could resort to section 301. Id. In 1988, Congress enacted a "super section 301"
enabling the U.S. Trade Representative to make a list of problematic States and to threaten the
States on that list of unilateral commercial sanctions unless they modified their commercial
practices before a given date, although it is no longer in effect. See Abbott, supra note 34, at
708; Tankoano, supra note 39, at 433. Also, section 337 of the 1930 United States Tariff Act
permits restraint of trade with foreign producers of goods imported in the United States that
are supported by unfair practices and are injuring the U.S. industry. 19 U.S.C. § 1337 (2000)
(as amended). The 1988 Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act eliminated the requirement
to prove harm to the U.S. industry in cases of IP right violations. See HOEKMAN & KoSTECKI,
supra note 35, at 278.
41.
The outcome of the negotiations shows that the increased protection of IP rights
was obtained with the concession of better access to markets in the fields of agriculture, natural resources, and textiles. Tankoano, supra note 39, at 470 (citing Frank Emmert, Intellectual
Property in the Uruguay Round-NegotiatingStrategies of the Western Industrialized Countries, 11 MICH. J. INT'L L. 1317, 1385 (1990)); HOEKMAN & KOSTECKI, supra note 35, at 298;
see also Mark A. Groombridge, The TRIPS Trade Off-Reconciling Competing Interests in the
Millennium Round, 2 J. WORLD INTELL. PROP. 991 (1999).
42.
HOEKMAN & KOSTECKI, supra note 35, at 274, 297.
43.
KEITH E. MASKUS, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY
17 (2000).
44.
Id.
45.
Article 4 provides: "With regard to the protection of intellectual property, any advantage, favour, privilege or immunity granted by a Member to the nationals of any other
country shall be accorded immediately and unconditionally to the nationals of all other Members." TRIPS Agreement, supra note 5, art. 4. A note attached to article 4 specifies that
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law and it is subject to various exceptions, including the existence of
regional trade agreements.46 The transparency obligation of governments
attaches to IP-related legislation, judicial decisions, and activities of administrative agencies. Another important feature of the TRIPS
Agreement is its incorporation by reference of certain core rights and
obligations contained in the Paris Convention (1967)." 8
As with the preexisting conventions, very few substantive standards
on the creation, recognition, or enforcement of IP rights are set forth in
the TRIPS Agreement. No harmonization was attempted; rather, the
TRIPS Agreement generally preserves States' ability to determine the
conditions and procedures necessary for the valid creation of IP rights.4 9
For various types of IP rights, some minimum protection standards are
specified.
Directly relevant to our discussion are the standards on trademarks.
Article 15, paragraph 1 of the TRIPS Agreement defines which signs
"shall be capable of constituting a trademark" and specifies that those
signs, especially names or words, "shall be eligible for registration as
trademarks." Article 16, paragraph 1, confers on the "owner of a registered trademark" a minimum international exclusive right to prevent the
use of such trademark by other people. Other substantive rights of
trademark owners derive from the provisions of the Paris Convention
(1967) that are incorporated through article 2 of the TRIPS Agreement.
Among the principles providing protection are: the undertaking by
member States to refuse or cancel registration and to prohibit the use of
a trademark reproducing or imitating a well-known mark (article 6bis)' °
the extension of the protection in all Member States of a mark registered
in one Member State (article 6quinquies),' and the protection of trade
names even in the absence of registration or filing (article 8).5"
In terms of enforcement mechanisms, the TRIPS Agreement is a
significant development. First, it imposes upon States the obligation to
provide domestic procedures aimed at the respect of IP rights. The mandatory measures to adopt are of three types: civil and administrative, to
ensure that private parties will be able to obtain protection of their IP
protection includes "matters affecting the availability, acquisition, scope, maintenance and
enforcement of intellectual property rights... " Id.

46.

However, there is a general grandfather clause for existing agreements and a few

specific exceptions in articles 4(a), 4(d), and 5. Id.
47.
Id. art. 63.

48.
14, 1967,
49.
50.
51.
52.

Id. art. 2, para. 1;Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, July
21 U.S.T. 1583, 828 U.N.T.S. 302 [hereinafter Paris Convention (1967)].
See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 5, art. 1,para. 1.
Paris Convention (1967), supra note 48, 21 U.S.T. at 1593, 828 U.N.T.S. at 324.
Id., 21 U.S.T.at 1595, 828 U.N.T.S. at 330.
Id., 21 U.S.T. at 1598, 828 U.N.T.S. at 334.
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rights and sanctions in case of non-respect; 3 penal measures, to stop intentional commercial-scale trademark counterfeiting and copyright
piracy;" and measures targeted to prevent the actual distribution of goods
produced in violation of IP rights, notably by requesting border authorities to suspend the free flow of such goods.5 Through those measures,
the TRIPS Agreement significantly enhances the direct protection of IP
right holders in Member States. A second-level form of protection, to
ensure the adequacy and conformity of domestic measures to the obligations undertaken in the TRIPS Agreement, is available to States through
the use of the WTO Dispute Settlement Body, which can eventually lead
to the imposition of sanctions. 6

III.

THE CLASH AS ILLUSTRATED IN THE HAVANA CLUB DISPUTE AND
THE SECTION 211 OF THE OMNIBUS APPROPRIATION ACT CASE

This Part illustrates the type of clashes to which the application of
the two regimes introduced above can lead. Given the different nature of
the proceedings, they do not, strictly speaking, deal with a given dispute,
as the proceedings before the Dispute Settlement Body of the WTO did
not involve a discussion of a specific case but remained concerned with
the construction of the regime as such.
A. The Havana Club Case
The Havana Club case, decided in the United States Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit, 7 deals with claims over the rights to the
"Havana Club" trademark and trade name. The plaintiffs are Havana
Club International (HCI), a joint stock company domiciled in Cuba and
set up under the law of that country, and Havana Club Holdings (HCH),
a corporation from Luxembourg that owns the "Havana Club" trademark
outside the United States. Defendants are part of the Bacardi Group,
with Bacardi & Company being set up in Liechtenstein and

53.
54.

TRIPS Agreement, supra note 5, arts. 42-49.
id. art. 61.

55.
56.

Id. arts. 51-60.
Id. art. 64.

57.
Havana Club Holding v. Galleon, 203 F.3d 116 (2d Cit. 2000). The first instance
decision would add little to the analysis of the distributive structure of the regimes. Havana
Club Holding v. Galleon, 961 F Supp. 498 (S.D.N.Y'1997). For a succinct summary, see
Donald R. Dinan, An Analysis of the United States-Cuba "Havana Club" Rum Case Before
the World Trade Organization,26 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 337, 344-45 (2003).
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headquartered in the Bahamas, and Bacardi-Martini USA being
registered as a Delaware corporation. 8
The rights in the production of Havana Club rum belonged, before
the Cuban revolution, to a Cuban corporation (JASA) which exported it
to the United States until 1960, when its assets were expropriated without compensation by the Cuban government. From 1972 to 1993,
Cubaexport exclusively exported Havana Club rum, mainly to former
Warsaw Pact countries, and it registered the trademark in Cuba in 1974
and in the United States in 1976. In 1993, Cubaexport reorganized its
rum export business with the involvement of foreign partners. The newly
formed Havana Rum & Liquors, S.A. (HR&L) and the French corporation Pernod Ricard, S.A. set up a joint venture that led to the creation of
HCI and HCH. In 1994, Cubaexport transferred its U.S. trademark to
HR&L, which assigned it to HCH. Those two assignments were approved by OFAC in November 1995 through a specific license
authorization.
Since 1994, HCI has exported Havana Club rum to many countries.
Havana Club rum is one of the most popular goods that American tourists in Cuba bring back home, but because of the embargo against Cuba,
HCI has not exported it to the United States (although it intends to do so
when it will become possible). Meanwhile, since 1995, Bacardi's predecessor-in-interest (Galleon S.A.) produced rum in the Bahamas labeled
"Havana Club," and distributed it in the United States. In April 1997,
Bacardi & Co. purchased the Arechaba family's (principal owner of
JASA) claim to the rights to the "Havana Club" trademark and its rights
to the goodwill of JASA. Following that transaction, HCH and HCI filed
a lawsuit seeking to prevent Bacardi from using what they claimed to be
their trademark over the "Havana Club" brand. After the filing of the
suit, OFAC issued a notice of retroactive revocation of Cubaexport's November 1995 license authorizing the transfers of the U.S. trademark.
HCH and HCI originally alleged that Bacardi's use of the trademark
violated sections 32 and 43(a) of the Lanham Act. After the district court
ruled that HCH and HCI had no right to the "Havana Club" mark following the revocation of the special license, 9 HCI and HCH asserted rights
to it under sections 44(g) and (h) of the Lanham Act: and under the

58.
Galleon S.A. was merged into Bacardi & Company. Collectively, the defendants
will be referred to as Bacardi.
59.
Havana Club, 961 F. Supp. at 505.
60.
Subsection (h) reads:
Any person designated in subsection (b) of this section as entitled to the benefits
and subject to the provisions of this chapter shall be entitled to effective protection

against unfair competition, and the remedies provided in this chapter for infringe-
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General Inter-American Convention for Trade Mark and Commercial
Protection (IAC). 61 Moreover, HCI sought to prevent use of the "Havana
Club" mark on the ground of the confusion that it caused, through the
mechanism provided by section 43(a) of the Lanham Act.62
The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit ruled in
favor of Bacardi on the three issues that are relevant to this Article,
namely on HCH's right to the "Havana Club" trademark, on HCI's right
to the trademark under the IAC, and on the false advertising claim. 63
1. HCH's Rights
On the first issue, HCH initially relied on the issuance by OFAC of a
"specific" license to validate the assignment of the rights to the trademark. After the said license had been cancelled by OFAC, HCH argued
that "the assignments remain valid under the general authorization of
section 515.527(a)(1) as transactions 'related to' the registration and renewal of a trademark."64
The court held that, by virtue of the prohibition contained in section
515.502(a), 65 no authorization of assignments made under section
515.527(a)(1) could validate a transaction effected prior to 1995, when
section 515.527 entered into force.66 The court specified in a footnote
that were HCH to react by obtaining a new assignment of the Havana

ments of marks shall be available so far as they may be appropriate in repressing
acts of unfair competition.
Trademark Act of 1946 (Lanham Act) § 44(h), 15 U.S.C. § 1126(h) (2000).
Havana Club, 203 F.3d at 121. The claim under the General Inter-American Con61.
vention for Trade Mark and Commercial Protection (IAC) rested on article 11:
The transfer of ownership of a registered or deposited mark in the country of its
original registration shall be effective and shall be recognized in the other Contracting States, provided that reliable proof be furnished that such transfer has been
executed and registered in accordance with the internal law of the State in which
such transfer took place. Such transfer shall be recorded in accordance with the legislation of the country in which it is to be effective.
General Inter-American Convention for Trade Mark and Commercial Protection, Feb. 20,
1929, art. 11, 46 Stat. 2907, 2922, 124 L.N.T.S. 357, 372 [hereinafter IAC].
62.
Havana Club, 203 F.3d at 122.
63.
Id. at 134-35. The fourth claim, based on the principle of unfair competition, will
be disregarded here given its lack of interaction with the principles grounding the holding of
the Appellate Body of the WTO in the Section 211 case.
64.
Id. at 123.
65.

"No ...authorization contained in this part ...shall be deemed to authorize or

validate any transaction effected prior to the issuance thereof, unless such ... authorization
specifically so provides." CACR, 31 C.F.R. § 515.502(a) (2002).,
66.
Havana Club, 203 F.3d at 123.
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Club trademark now, it would be precluded from doing so by section
211 (a)(1) of the OAA.67
The court then examined HCH's claim to authorization of the assignment under a general license. It ruled that in the context of the
Cuban embargo, the exceptions created by section 515.527(a)(1) must be
read narrowly. Relying on an interpretation by OFAC, the court concluded that "only Cubaexport, the original registrant of the United States
registration for the 'Havana Club' trademark, has the authority to renew
the 'Havana Club' trademark, and a specific license is required in order
to assign it."6 Given that the specific license had been cancelled, HCH
was unable to show a form of authorization of the transfer under U.S.
law and it consequently had no enforceable right against Bacardi.69
HCH's claim that a valid transfer of the right to the trademark under
Cuban law-where it had been originally registered-had been effected
and that the United States ought to recognize it by virtue of its obligation
under article 11 of the IAC, requiring the court to deal with the impact of
the IAC. The court held that there existed clear congressional intent that
assignments such as the one claimed by HCH be prohibited in the context of the Cuban embargo. Although the court explicitly wrote that it
was not applying retroactively the 1996 LIBERTAD Act and section
21 l(a)(1) of the OAA to the given case, the court derived support therefrom for its interpretation of congressional intent regarding the effect of
the section 515.527 license regime.
2. HCI's Rights
Section 44(b) of the Lanham Act provides the rights enjoyed by nationals of a country party to a convention relating to trademarks to which
the United States is also a party. This provision permitted HCI to claim
rights to the "Havana Club" trademark by virtue of the IAC. The court
held that rights under international conventions pertaining to trademarks
had to be channeled through section 44 of the Lanham Act and could not
be exercised independently thereof. 7 ° However, the court deemed that
HCI's claim under section 44(b) or (e) of the Lanham Act was explicitly
barred by the application of section 211 (b) of the OAA, given that the
corporation-domiciled in Cuba, set up under Cuban law, and having its
main business place in Cuba-fit the "designated national" criterion of
the provision." The court held that the nature of the remedy sought, an
67.
68.

Id. at 123 n.6.
Id. at 124.

69.

Id.

70.
71.

Id. at 127-28.
Id.
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injunction, operates infuturo, so that section 211 could consequently be
applied to the case without infringing the presumption against retroactive
application.
3. False Advertising
Finally, HCI sought to obtain damages from Bacardi for false advertising under section 43(a) of the Lanham Act.73 The district court had
denied HCI standing to act under section 43(a). The court of Appeals
upheld the finding of HCI's lack of standing, notably on the ground that
HCI was unable to adduce sufficient evidence that Bacardi's sale of Havana Club rum caused injuries to it. The court noted that "[b]ecause
HCI's rum does not now compete with Bacardi's rum in the United
States, HCI's alleged injury amounts to the present diminution in the
speculative value of its sales of Cuban-origin rum in the United States
market once the United States government removes the obstacle of the
Cuban embargo., 74 Qualifying the obstacle as "formidable," the court
refused to endorse HCI's speculation on the likelihood of a relaxation of
the embargo.75
B. The Section 211 Omnibus Appropriation Act of 1998 Case
In the Section 211 Omnibus Appropriation Act of 1998 case, the
European Communities challenged the conformity of section 211 of the
OAA with the TRIPS Agreement using the WTO Dispute Settlement
Body.
1. The Allegations of Clash with the WTO Regime
Before the WTO Panel, the EU raised fourteen grounds of inconsistency, all of them involving an inconsistency between section 211 (a)(1),

72.
73.

Id. at 129.
Section 43(a) reads:

Any person who, on or in connection with any goods or services, or any container
for goods, uses in commerce any word, term, name, symbol, or device, or any combination thereof, or any false designation of origin, false or misleading description
of fact, or false or misleading representation of facts, which is likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive as to the affiliation, connection, or
association of such person with another person, or as to the origin, sponsorship, or
approval of his or her goods, services, or commercial activities by another person ... shall be liable in a civil action by any person who believes that he or she is
likely to be damaged by such act.
Trademark Act of 1946 (Lanham Act) § 43(a), 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (2000).
74.
Havana Club, 203 F.3d at 132.
75.
Id.

Michigan Journalof InternationalLaw

[Vol. 24:767

(a)(2), or (b) with some provisions of the TRIPS Agreement (sometimes
in conjunction with provisions of the Paris Convention (1967)).76
For the sake of clarity, one can classify the arguments advanced by the
EU in two categories. First, there are the principles against which section
21 1(a)(1), dealing with the granting of a license authorizing transfers of
rights, is said to go: article 15.1 of the TRIPS Agreement (signs capable of
constituting a trademark); and article 2.1 of the TRIPS Agreement in
conjunction with article 6A(1) of the Paris Convention (1967) (recognition
and protection of trademarks filed in other signatory States)." Second,
there are principles that section 21 1(b)(1) and (2), pertaining to the
exercise of rights before a court, are alleged to violate: articles 4 (MFN
clause), 16.1 (right of the owner to prevent the use of the trademark), and
42 (availability of civil judicial procedure) of the TRIPS Agreement; and
article 2.1 of the TRIPS Agreement in conjunction with articles 2(1)
(national treatment),"8 6bis (protection of well-known marks), 9 and 8
(protection of trade names even absent a registration) of the Paris
Convention (1967).80
The very vast majority of the EU's arguments were rejected as being
unfounded or as not providing sufficient evidence of a violation of the
principles contained in the TRIPS Agreement. The latter ground means
that while some interpretations would likely violate the principles of the
TRIPS Agreement, compatible interpretations remain possible. Given
that States are deemed to comply with their undertakings, no inconsistency findings are made on the basis of merely potential
inconsistencies.8 In order to remain focused on the actual clash between
both regimes, the following deals exclusively with the grounds on which
the Panel or the Appellate Body held that there was an inconsistency between section 211 and the TRIPS Agreement.82

76.
WTO Panel Report, United States-Section 211 Omnibus Appropriation Act of
1998, WT/DS176/R (Aug. 6, 2001), available at http://www.wto.org (last accessed Apr. 21,
2003) [hereinafter Section 211 OAA Panel Report].
77.
Paris Convention (1967), supra note 48, 21 U.S.T.at 1595, 828 U.N.T.S. at 330.
78.
Id., 21 U.S.T.at 1585, 828 U.N.T.S. at 312. On this ground, article 3.1 of the TRIPS
Agreement is also invoked.
79.
Id., 21 U.S.T. at 1593, 828 U.N.T.S. at 324.
80.
Id., 21 U.S.T. at 1598, 828 U.N.T.S. at 334.
81.
See WTO Appellate Body Report, United States-Anti Dumping Act of 1916, para.
88, WT/DS 136/AB/R, WT/DS I62/AB/R (Sept. 26, 2000), available at http://www.wto.org
(last accessed Apr. 21, 2003); Section 211 OAA Appellate Body Report, supra note 7, para.
259.
82.
For an overview of how the Panel and the Appellate Body (AB) dealt with all the
arguments of the Parties, including the claims of violation of the TRIPS Agreement that were
dismissed, see Dinan, supra note 57, at 351-73.
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2. The Panel's Holding
The Panel held that trade names were not covered by the TRIPS
Agreement and therefore exclusively focused on the EU's challenge of
the U.S. measures as they related to trademarks. As previously mentioned, the Panel rejected the vast majority of the inconsistency
arguments submitted by the EU. In fact, it received the EU's argument
only with regard to the inconsistency of section 211 (a)(2) with article 42
of the TRIPS Agreement. It reasoned as follows:
... in the United States, the registration of a trademark confers a
primafaciepresumption of the registrant's ownership of the registered trademark. This means that, in the United States, the
holder of a registration is deemed to be the owner unless otherwise proven. A person who enjoys the presumption of being the
owner of a trademark under US law must be entitled to a level of
protection of its rights that meets the US obligations under the
TRIPS Agreement, including Article 42. Consequently, in our interpretation, this presumptive owner must have access to civil
judicial procedures that are effective in terms of bringing about
the enforcement of its rights until the moment that there is a determination by the court that it is, in fact, not the owner of the
trademark that it has registered or that there is some other disqualifying ground which is compatible with international
obligations.

We note the US argument that Section 21 1(a)(2) does not affect
the availability of judicial procedures to any party to assert a
right to a trademark. However, given the clear wording of
Section 211(a)(2) which provides that "[n]o U.S. court shall
recognize, enforce or otherwise validate any assertion of rights"
in certain circumstances, we fail to see how a right holder would
be able effectively to assert its rights under these circumstances.
While Section 21 1(a)(2) would not appear to prevent a right
holder from initiating civil judicial procedures, its wording
indicates that the right holder is not entitled to effective
procedures as the court is ab initio not permitted to recognize its
assertion of rights if the conditions of Section 211 (a)(2) are met.
In other words, the right holder is effectively prevented from
having a chance to substantiate its claim, a chance to which a
right holder is clearly entitled under Article 42, because effective
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civil judicial procedures mean procedures with the possibility of
an outcome which is not pre-empted a prioriby legislation.83
3. The Appellate Body's Holding
Following the Panel's holding, the EU appealed and the United
States counter-appealed some of the Panel's findings and interpretations." The Appellate Body concurred with the Panel that section
21 l(a)(l) did not run counter any of the provisions of the TRIPS Agreement that were invoked by the EU. Thus, the problematic provisions
were section 21 1(a)(2) and (b).
Contrary to the Panel's holding, the Appellate Body opined that section 21 1(a)(2) was not inconsistent with article 42 of the TRIPS
Agreement. By doing so, the Appellate Body aligned its finding on the
consistency of section 211(a)(2) with article 42 with the conclusion of
compatibility of sections 21 1(a)(1) with the same article 42. The Appellate Body agreed with the Panel that, under article 42, making
procedures available conveyed an element of efficacy of those procedures and that the category of "right holders" is wider than that of
persons who have been recognized as owners of the trademark.85 It held
that article 42 forced States to grant procedural rights to "right holders."86
The Appellate Body then insisted that "in the circumstances in which
they apply, Section 21 l(a)(2) and (b) deal with the substantive requirements of ownership in a defined category of trademarks. 87 The
determining factor, for the Appellate Body, was whether a statute can
limit the discretion of courts to examine certain substantive requirements
before, and to the exclusion of, other substantive requirements. It held
that, given the procedural nature of the rights in article 42, nothing prevented a State from so doing. On the compatibility of section 21 l(a)(2),
it concluded:
Section 211(a)(2) does not prohibit courts from giving right
holders access to fair and equitable civil judicial procedures and
the opportunity to substantiate their claims and to present all
relevant evidence. Rather, Section 211(a)(2) only requires the
83.
84.

Section 211 OAA Panel Report, supra note 76, paras. 8.99-. 100.
The EU and the United States both argued that trade names were covered by the

TRIPS Agreement. Section 211 OAA Appellate Body Report, supra note 7, para. 325. The
Appellate Body concurred with this position and consequently held that the grounds of incon-

sistency with provisions of the TRIPS Agreement with respect to trademarks were replicated
with respect to trade names. Id. paras. 333-41.
85.

Section 211 OAA Appellate Body Report, supra note 7, paras. 215, 217-18.

86.

Id. para. 221.

87.

Id. para. 222.

88.

Id. para. 226.
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United States courts not recognize, enforce or otherwise validate
any assertion of rights by designated nationals or successors-ininterest who have been determined, after applying United States
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and Federal Rules of Evidence,
not to own the trademarks referred to in Section 21 l(a)(2). As
we have said, Section 21 1(a)(2) deals with the substance of
ownership. Therefore, we do not believe that Section 21 l(a)(2)
denies the proceduralrights that are guaranteed by Article 42.89
The Appellate Body applied a similar analysis to section 211(b),
concluding that on their face, the provisions were not inconsistent with
article 42. However, the Appellate Body specified:
[T]he European Communities has challenged Section 211(a)(2)
and (b) on theirface. The European Communities has not challenged the application of Sections 21 l(a)(2) and (b) in particular
instances by the United States courts. Accordingly, our conclusions that Section 211(a)(2) and (b) are not inconsistent with
Article 42 relate to that measure on its face. We do not rule on
whether a particular United States court has, or has not, violated
the requirements of Article 42 in applying Sections 21 1(a)(2)
and (b) in any particular case.90
Although it overruled the Panel's holding with respect to article 42,
the Appellate Body retained two grounds of inconsistency between the
provisions of the TRIPS Agreement (or of the Paris Convention (1967)
through article 2(1) of the TRIPS Agreement) and section 21 l(a)(2) and
(b). The Appellate Body first dealt with the national treatment principle
(article 2(1) of the Paris Convention (1967) and article 3.1 of the TRIPS
Agreement) and recognized in it "a fundamental principle underlying the
TRIPS Agreement."9' In its examination of the national treatment principle, the Appellate Body distinguished between successors-in-interest and
original owners. Regarding the former category, the Appellate Body concluded that section 21 l(a)(2) is inconsistent with the requirements of the
national treatment principle in that it imposes an "extra hurdle" to which
U.S. successors-in-interest are not subject.92 Given that the United States
has not shown that its courts, in every case, will refuse to validate the
assertion of rights by a U.S. successor-in-interest, the possibility of facing two hurdles instead of one exists. 93 However, given the different
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.

Id. para. 227.
Id. para. 232.
Id. para. 242.
Id. paras. 255-56.
Id. paras. 265-69.
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wording of section 211(b) which deals with successors-in-interest, regardless of their origin, the Appellate Body ruled that the said provision
is not inconsistent with the national treatment principle.94
Regarding original owners, the Appellate Body discussed a hypothetical case put to it by the European Communities: that of two owners
of a U.S. trademark that is the same as a preconfiscation trademark in
Cuba, except that the first owner is a U.S. national while the other one is
a national of Cuba. Neither of the owners of the U.S. trademark is the
owner of the similar trademark in Cuba. The Appellate Body held that,
on their face, sections 211(a)(2) and (b) apply measures to a Cuban
original owner that a U.S. original owner is dispensed of, and are therefore prima facie discriminatory. 9 The fact that original owners may
consent to the transfer does not alleviate the discriminatory character of
the provision, given that there is no de facto necessary coincidence between the Cuban owner of the U.S. trademark and the Cuban owner of
the Cuban trademark.96
The Appellate Body then examined the United States' argument to
the effect that there are mechanisms to eliminate the prima facie discrimination. It agreed with the United States that in the case of a Cuban
original owner now residing in the United States, the discrimination was
lifted through the "unblocking" mechanism of section 515.505 of the
CACR, which grants Cuban original owners the same treatment as that
of a U.S. national. 97 However, Cuban original owners now residing in
94.
Id. paras. 270-72.
95.
Id. paras. 277-81.
96.
Id. para. 282. The Appellate Body specifies the discrimination for trademarks based
on common law, but also for trademarks based on registration, notably because the obligation
to renew the registration of the trademark makes Cuban original owners vulnerable to the
discriminatory policy. Id. paras. 283-84.
97.
The regulations state in relevant part:
(a)

The following persons are hereby licensed as unblocked nationals.
(I) Any person resident in, or organized under the laws of a jurisdiction in,
the United States or the authorized trade territory who or which has never
been a designated national;
(2) Any individual resident in the United States who is not a specially designated national; and
(3) Any corporation, partnership or association that would be a designated
national solely because of the interest therein of an individual licensed in
paragraph (a) or (b) of this section as an unblocked national.
(b) Individual nationals of a designated country who have taken up residence in
the authorized trade territory may apply to the Office of Foreign Assets Control to be specifically licensed as unblocked nationals.
(c) The licensing of any person as an unblocked national shall not suspend the requirements of any section of this chapter relating to the maintenance or
production of records.
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Cuba or in any country other than the United States remain discriminated against. In the former case, there is no unblocking mechanism
available at all, whereas in the latter scenario, unblocking requires an
application to the OFAC, thus discriminating by imposing an additional
hurdle.98
The Panel also concluded that the handling of original owners in section 21 l(a)(2) and (b) was inconsistent with the MFN principle of article
4 of the TRIPS Agreement." The Appellate Body examined this issue on
the basis of the same hypothetical scenario described above for the national treatment issue, except that in this scenario, the second original
owner is not a U.S. national, but rather a foreign national from a country
other than Cuba (non-Cuban foreign national). Once again, there is
primafacie discrimination against the Cuban original owner because she
is subject to section 211 (a)(2) and (b), while the non-Cuban foreign national is not. As with the case for the national treatment argument, the
Appellate Body concluded that the United States did not satisfactorily
rebut the presumption of noncompliance with the MFN principle.
Pursuant to its finding of inconsistency of the U.S. legislative measures with some provisions of the TRIPS Agreement, the Appellate Body
recommended that the Dispute Settlement Body request the United
States to bring those measures in conformity with its obligations under
the TRIPS Agreement.' °° The United States was originally expected to
adopt legislative amendments to comply with the Appellate Body's findings by the end of 2002, but the EU consented to grant the United States
an additional six month delay to comply with the ruling of the Appellate
Body. 10

CACR, 31 C.F.R. § 515.505 (2002).
98.
Section 211 OAA Appellate Body Report, supra note 7, paras. 287-90. The Appel-

late Body was also left unconvinced by the argument of the United States at paragraphs 29194. Id. paras. 291-94.

99.
No argument was put before the Appellate Body by the European Communities
with respect to successors-in-interest. Id. para. 304.
100.
Id. para. 361.
101.
Communication, dated 28 March 2002, from the Permanent Delegation of the
European Commission and the Permanent Mission of the United States to the Chairman of the
Dispute Settlement Body, WTJDS 176/10 (Apr. 5, 2002), availableat http://www.wto.org (last
accessed Apr. 21, 2003). For the extension of the deadline for compliance, see EuropeanAmerican Business Council, Special Report: Status of EU-US Trade Disputes, at http://
www.eabc.org/Disputes2003.htm (last visited Apr. 21, 2003).
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Before we turn to a more analytical part of this Article, it is useful to
quote the Appellate Body's statement on the scope of the case, as it
equally describes limits of the analysis that follows:
We wish to emphasize that this ruling is not a judgment on confiscation as that term is defined in Section 211. The validity of
the expropriation of intellectual or any other property rights
without compensation by a WTO Member within its own territory is not before us. Nor do we express any view, nor are we
required to express any view in this appeal, on whether a Member of the WTO should, or should not, recognize in its own
territory trademarks, trade names, or any other rights relating to
intellectual or other property rights that may have been expropriated or otherwise confiscated in other territories.
However, where a WTO Member chooses not to recognize intellectual property rights in its own territory relating to a
confiscation of rights in another territory, a measure resulting
from and implementing that choice must, if it affects other WTO
Members, comply with the TRIPS Agreement, by which all
WTO Members are voluntarily bound.... In such a measure, a
WTO Member may not discriminate in a way that does not respect the obligations of national treatment and most-favourednation treatment that are fundamental to the TRIPS Agreement."2

IV. CONCEPTUALIZING THE CLASH OF REGIMES IN

TERMS OF DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE

It could be tempting to analyze the Havana Club dispute, or similar
ones, as a mere clash of technical principles, detached from the values
and interests that they serve. Another approach rests on the classification
of the two regulatory frameworks along essentializing lines, thus explaining or justifying their autonomy.' 3 To put such a view bluntly, the
U.S. regulatory framework concerning Cuba-originating IP rights would
be political by nature whereas the TRIPS Agreement would belong to
trade policy.
In terms of consistency of lexicon, historical background, and epistemic communities concerned, such approaches might be internally
defended. However, there are central structural considerations in the
102.
103.

Section 211 OAA Appellate Body Report, supra note 7, paras. 362-63.
See generally Dinan. supra note 57, at 374; Misha Gregory Macaw, The New Rum

War: Havana Club as a Threat to the U.S. Interest in InternationalTrademark Harmonization,
18 B.U. INT'L L.J. 291, 332 (2000).
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construction of the two regimes that seem seminal and underpinning, yet
little discussed. These considerations permit linking rules with history,
interests and values: these are distributive justice considerations. For the
purposes of this Article, left aside is the-concededly extremely important-question of the distributive stake between developed and
developing countries in the design of the TRIPS regime.' °4 Instead, I take
the TRIPS regime as a given, and focus on its clash with the distributive
structure put forward under the U.S. embargo against Cuba. There are
also other distributive concerns that are linked with the creation of an IP
regime that are left aside here, such as the allocation of costs of implementation of the regime,' 5 the distributive tension between IP creators
and consumers,'M° and the incidental and often detrimental impact of the
distribution of IP rights on the distribution of public goods.0 7
104.
The literature on how the TRIPS Agreement resolves the tension between the technological and economic interests of developing countries and those of developed countries,
i.e., on the fairness of the convention in distributive terms, is abundant. A fair assessment of
the distributive dynamics is given by Dani Rodrick:
All evidence and arguments ... point to the conclusion that, to a first-order approximation, TRIPS are a distributive issue: irrespective of assumptions made with
respect to market structure or dynamic response, the impact effect of enhanced IPR
protection ... will be a transfer of wealth from [developing country] consumers and
firms to foreign, mostly industrial-country firms.
Dani Rodrick, Comments on Maskus and Eby-Knoan, in ANALYTICAL AND NEGOTIATING
ISSUES IN THE GLOBAL TRADING SYSTEM 447, 449 (Alan V. Deardorff & Robert M. Stern eds.,
1994); see HOEKMAN & KOSTECKI, supra note 35, at 298; see also CARLOS M. CORREA, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS, THE WTO AND DEVELOPING COUNTRIES (2000); JAYASHREE
WATAL, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN THE WTO AND DEVELOPING COUNTRIES

(2001); Abbott, supra note 34; Chiappetta, supra note 14; Esperanza Durdn & Constantine
Michalopoulos, Intellectual Property Rights and Developing Countries in the WTO Millennium Round, 2 J. WORLD INTELL. PROP. 853 (1999); Groombridge, supra note 41; J. H.
Reichman, From Free Riders to Fair Followers: Global Competition Under the TRIPS Agreement, 29 N.YU. J. INT'L. L. & POL. 11 (1996-1997).
105.
HOEKMAN & KOSTECKI, supra note 35, at 290.

106.

On this distributive tension, Hoekman and Kostecki note:

In economies that are significant net importers of technologies and knowledgeintensive goods and services, the rents paid by consumers to producers (rightholders) are transferred outside the country. This implies that in an international
context, IPRs are not simply a mechanism to redistribute income among different
groups in a given society, with an associated static efficiency deadweight loss. They
may involve significant transfers across countries. That is, net importers may experience a reduction in national welfare (a terms-of-trade loss) as foreign producers
extract rents from domestic consumers.

Id. at 293-94.
107.
See, e.g., Yochai Benkler, A Political Economy of the Public Domain: Markets in
Information Goods Versus the Marketplace of Ideas, in EXPANDING THE BOUNDARIES OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: INNOVATION POLICY FOR THE KNOWLEDGE SOCIETY 267 (Rochelle
Cooper Dreyfuss et al. eds., 2001); Rosemary J. Coombe, Objects of Property and Subjects of

Politics: IntellectualProperty Laws and DemocraticDialogue, 69 Thx. L. REV. 1853 (1991).
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A useful way to discuss distributive justice issues is to recognize that
it deals with three dimensions: justice in acquisition, justice in transfer or
transaction, and rectificative justice for failure to comply with the first
two principles." 8 Under this perspective, distributive justice takes expression in a historical context.' ° It bears an important process orientation
and accepts a wide array of distributive outcomes, provided that they are
produced in conformity with the fair principles of justice in acquisition
and justice in transfer." ° The constitutive elements of distributive justice
theories-or of distributive schemes-are fourfold: (1) identification of
goods to distribute; (2) identification of the appropriate distributive formulae; (3) identification of a community of individuals or society in
which the distributive scheme is operative; and (4) identification of the
values underpinning the construction of a distributive scheme.
. A plurality of regimes often means that claims can be substantiated
and their enforcement can be sought from different sources and through
different institutions. Such plurality results in the creation of diverse
forms of IP protection operating over partially overlapping zones. The
various forms of protection created by those regimes can be classified in
two categories: ownership rights (usus,fructus, abusus) and enforcement
possibilities (injunctive and reparative mechanisms). If these two categories of rights are closely related and if the distinction may at times seem
artificial, they remain analytically distinguishable. The distinction will
be kept here to deal with how the two regimes deal with the possibility
of transfer of the trademark (transfer prerogative), and how they distribute the enforcement possibilities of the trademark against alleged
infringers. In a sense, these two forms of prerogatives can be said to be
"distributed" by the regimes, that is, they are formally recognized as belonging (or as not belonging) to identifiable people and creating

108.
NozICK, supra note 12, at 150-53. I should point out that it is not my objective to
set forward here a normative theory of distributive justice or to endorse one: I am not suggesting what a fair or correct distributive framework should be in the given case. By glancing at
the work of a few authors, I merely aim at discussing a few analytical tools that will help in
conducting the analysis of the two regimes under study.
109.
Nozick holds that "past circumstances or actions of people can create differential
entitlements or differential deserts to things." Id. at 155.
110.
Id. at 153; Ronald Dworkin, What is Equality?, Part 2: Equality of Resources, 10
PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 283, 291 (1981). However, as Dworkin argued, unless one considers the
right to property as being absolute, the procedural or historical dimension of a theory of distributive justice does not prevent setting principles of substantive fairness in the principles of
justice in acquisition or in transfer, through periodical "fixes" or adjustment mechanisms. Id.

at 309-10. This position could be considered as not endorsed by Nozick when he rejects "patterned" theories of justice (i.e., theories that can take the form of "to each according to his
"). NozICK, supra note 12, at 160.
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expectations of respect thereof."' This is the angle from which this Article analyzes the tension between the regimes. Thus, the Havana Club
dispute can be conceived as taking root in divergent distributive constructions.
This Article will first deal with the distributive construction of the
regimes at stake here by discussing how they vary or converge on the
four axes of distributive schemes identified above. The first three elements will be approached separately for both types of rights (transfer
prerogative and right-claim) and the fourth one only once, given its more
general character. The next Section will turn to the absence of any notion
of self-containment of those regimes or, to put it differently, the impact
of mobility of actors in a context of plurality of distributive schemes.
A. Distributionof the Transfer Prerogativeof
Cuba-OriginatingIP Rights
Goods for distribution-Both regimes distribute IP rights of a proprietary nature. ' 2 Of course, the regimes deal at the same time with
many types of IP rights and their scope varies accordingly. It suffices for
the purposes of analyzing the Havana Club dispute to note that we are
specifically concerned here with trademarks or commercial names.
Given that the domestic rules define the scope and conditions of the pro-3
prietary rights for both the domestic and the international regimes,"
there is identity in both regimes as to the object of distribution. The
modification brought by the embargo against Cuba affects a specific
class of IP rights, namely, those rights confiscated by the Cuban government since January 1, 1959. However, the identity of the goods whose
distribution is at stake is still encompassed by the ambit of both regimes,
the difference lying mainly in the distributive formula or the community
of distribution.
111.
Maybe, as opposed to what Nozick says, there is a two-time process of production
and distribution here. If you consider that an IP right is part of your work (that it is an integral
part of it and therefore belongs to you), then IP rights are produced and distributed at the same
time and you obtain a form of Lockean right as wide as the produced goods. But if you focus
on the social function of IP, then it does not follow from the mere production of IP-labelable
goods that IP rights co-terminal to the goods themselves automatically ought to be recognized
or created. In other words, if our economic structure distinguishes the production of goods
from the distribution of rights, then there is no necessity for an absolute overlap of their scope.
The limited temporal dimension of IP rights despite the continuous production of the goods
for which IP rights have been recognized is illustrative of the non-necessity of overlap.
112.
There was a question in the Section 211 OAA case regarding whether the TRIPS
Agreement covered trade names as well as trademarks. The Panel answered in the negative, a
finding that was overturned by the Appellate Body and that consequently establishes or recognizes a broader identity between the goods distributed under the U.S. domestic regime and the
TRIPS Agreement.
113.
See supra text accompanying note 49.
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Distributiveformulae-With respect to the distribution of substantive rights, the U.S. regime allocates rights in a direct manner, through
the legal institutions of use, registration, and treaty implementation,
whereas the TRIPS Agreement does so indirectly, through the mediation
of domestic law institutions. In a sense, it is acknowledged in the structure or construction of both regimes that the scope of allocation of
substantive rights is determined by the interplay of both regimes. The
very principles of distribution are mainly, although not exclusively, determined in the domestic legal framework: the U.S. domestic regime sets
out the material and procedural conditions for the obtainment and recognition of substantive IP rights. The international framework contributes
with limitations to the possible domestic conditions. The ratione materiae dimensions of the distribution-that is, the identification of goods to
be distributed and the material principle of distribution (or distributive
formula)-are the result of such interaction. Because of the structural
intricacy of both regimes, there is no clear clash on the distributive formulae-the conditions of obtaining an IP right originating in Cuba are
not posed in different terms by the TRIPS Agreement than they are domestically. In fact, the TRIPS Agreement adopts the domestic standards
in that respect.
With respect to the creation of Cuba-originating IP rights in the
United States (an issue not at stake in the Havana Club dispute), the distributive formula is straightforward: a trademark can be acquired through
4
use (or reputation, for well-known marks) or through registration.'"
With respect to the transfer of Cuba-originating IP rights, the U.S.
Congress has designed a distributive formula according to which transactions or transfers of a Cuba-originating IP right that was confiscated
can be effected, but shall be approved only if the original owner or the
bona fide successor-in-interest has expressly consented to it. This distributive formula is specifically targeted to Cuba-originating IP rights, as
transfers of other IP rights are not subjected to such a requirement. To
put it in a more schematic way, the distributive formulae can be summed
as:
"

recognition of the transfer, conducted under the normal contractual rules, without the need for consent by the original
owner or the bona fide successor-in-interest;

"

recognition of the transfer, conducted under the normal contractual rules, with the need for consent by the original owner
or successor-in-interest.

114.

15 U.S.C. §§ 1057(b), 11 15(a) (2000).
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Community of Distribution-With respect to the ratione personae
dimension of the distribution (the identification of the community of
people entitled to claim participation in the ratione materiae distribution), the interplay of both regimes is not in as great a conflict as one
could think at first glance. Indeed, the U.S. regime dealing with the acquisition or transfer of Cuba-originating substantive IP rights does not
create two distinct distributive spheres or two communities of distribution. Section 21 1(a)(1), which states the formula for the transfer of such
rights, is carefully drafted so that no two distinct categories are created.
All actors are confronted with the same principles of distribution. This is
consonant with the general principles of national treatment and of the
MFN clause enacted in the TRIPS Agreement.
It thus comes as a surprise that with respect to the creation and transfer of Cuba-originating IP rights, the construction of both regimes is
similar from a distributive standpoint. The fact that one can easily have a
contrary impression rests, on the one hand, with the divergent distributive construction of the right-claims which are closely attached to rightproperty (especially when they cannot be positively exercised in the
United States because of the trade embargo), and on the other hand, with
the development of the different schemes on the basis of different values
and in different historical contexts.
B. Distributionof Enforcement Prerogativesof the
Cuba-OriginatingIP Rights
With respect to the distribution of enforcement possibilities, the distributive spin of both regimes is different, and it sheds light on the clash
that one faces if he or she wants to apply them simultaneously.
Goods for Distribution-As opposed to the creation and transfer
prerogatives under both regimes, the two frameworks do not fully match
with respect to the right-claims they provide. They differ as to the types
of right-claims offered, as well as with respect to their scope. In terms of
types of prerogatives, the right-claims distributed under U.S. domestic
law consist of preventive enforcement or vindication possibilities of the
right-property before U.S. domestic courts or organs. Thus, an IP right
owner-whether the right originates from Cuba or not-can obtain an
injunction preventing a corporation from using its trademark' and seek
damages for the wrongful use of its trademark by a nonauthorized person. 16 The right-claims distributed by the TRIPS Agreement include the

115.
116.

Id.§ 1116.
Id.§ 1114.
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same possibilities
as alluded to for the U.S. domestic IP right protection
7
framework."
The main difference between the systems rests on the fact that the
TRIPS Agreement allows for forms of international claims that are not
available to people who are strictly confined to the domestic framework
(i.e., U.S. nationals). The TRIPS Agreement allows States to use the
WTO dispute settlement mechanism to ensure the structural conformity
of another Member State's legislation with the prescriptions of the
TRIPS Agreement (in terms of substantive IP rights and of enforcement
possibilities). Although an indirect form of protection-as it aims at the
conformity of the domestic system with the international one, more than
at protection of given interests of a specific person-it still is part of the
enforcement machinery and is an important feature defining the modus
of articulation of both regimes." 8
The right-claims formally attached to States and specifically created
by the existence of the TRIPS Agreement have a distributive formula of
their own: they are limited to co-signatory States of the TRIPS Agreement and are meant to serve, in practice, the interests of their national
corporations. An interstate regime with an efficient dispute settlement
mechanism presents the valuable advantage of creating international
claims of a stronger intensity than international claims in front of domestic tribunals. The result is that the protection prerogatives of foreign
Cuba-originating IP right claimants are strengthened and institutionalized at a second level.
It is interesting to note that, albeit a different and specialized branch
of international law, the main protection mechanism of the TRIPS
Agreement bears some similarity to the older law of diplomatic protection as applied to corporations." 9 As in the case of diplomatic protection,
the ultimate beneficiary of the international obligation imposed upon the
State is an alien (corporation), even though the said corporation cannot
itself initiate an international judiciary mechanism. In both cases, the
fiction of a State right or interest rests on the notion of reciprocity of
117.
On the right to prevent use of the trademark, see TRIPS Agreement, supra note 5,
art. 16, para. 1. On the obligation of States to set up civil law measures to protect IP rights, see
id. arts. 42-49. In addition to these two rights, there is also a mechanism designed to stop the
free flow of goods violating IP rights protected in articles 51-60. Id. arts. 51-60.
118.
Moreover, States could also resort to diplomatic protection of a corporation bearing
its nationality the right of which-allegedly deriving from the TRIPS Agreement-would not
have been respected.
119.
See generally L. CAFLISCH, LA PROTECTION DES SOCIITIS COMMERCIALES ET DES
INT9RETS INDIRECTS EN DROIT INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC (1969); Paul De Visscher, La protection diplomatique des personnes morales, 102 RECUEIL DES COURs 395 (1961); Manuel Diez

De Velasco, La protection diplomatique des socidtds et des actionnaires, 141
COURs 86 (1974).

RECUEIL DES
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treatment of alien corporations and is used to bridge the gap between
identity of the procedurally recognized claimant and that of the bearer of
the substantive rights. Moreover, as is the case with the institution of
diplomatic protection, the relative position of the actors-i.e., the corporation, the "host" State, and the State of nationality-is to be taken into
account in the evaluation of the actual enforcement of those right-claims.
Finally, given that rights are exchangeable transnationally, the protection
of easily tradeable rights is likely to create problems and possibilities
that are similar to those created by the mobility of enterprises for the
institution of diplomatic protection. Transnational tradeability permits
exploitation of zones or networks of interaction under which protection
is better provided, given power asymmetries of States backing the claims
of their "nationals."
Distributive Formulae-The distributive formula of the right-claims
of individuals or corporations, when those rights are linked to Cubaoriginating IP rights, retained by the U.S. domestic regime is twofold:
(A) right-claims are recognized or granted to people able to establish their ownership of or license for the trademark;
(B) right-claims usually granted are unenforceable for the following category of claimants:
(a) designated national seeking prerogatives for a trademark
obtained through use (at common law) or for a registered
confiscated trademark;
(b) designated national or its successor-in-interest seeking
treaty-based prerogatives for a trademark identical or
similar to a confiscated trademark, unless the designated
national has obtained the consent of either the original
owner of the said trademark or the original owner's bona
fide successor-in-interest.
The main question at stake here is that of the principle of articulation
or the facteur de rattachementof the various principles. Is the variable
on which the choice of the principle of distribution rests acceptable and
compatible with what the TRIPS Agreement exacts? In the present case,
some of the principles of distribution of right-claims are articulated
along a principle of nationality, which is clearly problematic given the
endorsement of the national treatment principle and the MFN clause in
the TRIPS Agreement.
Community of Distribution-With respect to the ratione personae
dimension of the distribution, the interplay of the regimes operates
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differently. The design of the U.S. regime allocates right-claims in such a
way that it segments the community of distribution. In tune with the
decision of the Appellate Body of the WTO, one can divide the
possibilities according to whether the rights of an original owner or of a
successor-in-interest are at stake. With respect to original owners, the
various segments of the community of distribution are:
(1) U.S. national as original owner;
(2) Cuban national as original owner:
(a) residing in the United States;
(b) residing in a foreign country (except Cuba);
(c) residing in Cuba;
With respect to successors-in-interest, the segments of the community of distribution created by section 211 are:
(3) U.S. successors-in-interest;
(4) Foreign successors-in-interest.
The articulation of the distributive formula can be considered relative to the various segments of the community of distribution. For claims
formulated under purely domestic vehicles (registration and common
law), the articulation is as follows:
An owner of type (1) always benefits from the principle of distribution A and so does an owner of type (2)(a), through the
unblocking mechanism; however, an owner of type (2)(c) is subjected to the principle of distribution B, whereas an owner of
type (2)(b) can benefit from principle A, subject to a specific
administrative requirement.
An owner of type (3) could potentially be able to benefit from all
the right-claims associated with a Cuba-originating trademark
(principle of distribution A), whereas an owner (4) is condemned
to nothing, under principle B.
When a claim is formulated on a treaty basis, the articulation is
slightly different. The first type of distinction exists as such,
whereas there is no longer a difference of treatment between
categories (3) and (4), both of them being subjected to the distributive formula B.
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This is where the U.S. embargo against Cuba and the TRIPS Agreement most seriously clash. The former was designed to prevent
corporations of the larger distributive community to obtain or enforce
prerogatives against corporations of a community of distribution deemed
to have priority. The latter was set up with the precise objective of desegmenting communities of distribution and merging them into a larger
one, even if it operated on the basis of many distributive formulae. The
TRIPS Agreement not only limits the ability of the domestic polity to
enact personality-attached conditions for participation in the distributive
scheme, it mandates the extension to all people who are nationals of a
State participating in the international regime. As Chiappetta puts it, "[i]f
the WTO is viewed as a shared common economic enterprise, the distributional boundary expands to include all members ' ' 2' Through the legal
institutions of the national treatment principle and of the MFN clause,
the domestic regime of allocation or distribution of substantive IP rights
is extended to a larger community. It does not prevent States, in the absence of denationalized economies, to design IP rights modalities so as
to benefit the more immediate national distributive boundaries.' 2' But the
TRIPS Agreement prevents the segmentation--or to put it more in a historical context, forces the unification-of the community of distribution
through the application of different terms or modalities of IP rights. The
dynamics of the two regimes are clearly opposite.
C. Explaining the Clash in Terms of Values
and in the Light of History
The dissection of the two regimes to unveil their inner workings has
shown important divergences. Traditional principles of resolution of conflicts between regulatory frameworks (later-in-time doctrine, trumping of
lex specialis over lex generalis, institutional status as paramount, interpretative techniques, and related doctrines) can contribute to lessen the
intensity of the conflict their simultaneous application would create. The
conflicts among distributive schemes are less easily solved when they
involve not only different distributive principles and communities, but
are also aimed at attaining different objectives through distribution. The
creation of a particular scheme as part of a rectificative enterprise provides a particular instance of such intricate conflict. In such cases, the
distributive ethos is a function of the perceived non-respect of the principles of justice in acquisition and justice in transfer, and aims at
countering the effect of those violations. When such a distributive
scheme clashes with one simply setting the proper terms of acquisition
120.
121.

Chiappetta, supra note 14, at 357.
Id. at 368.
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and transfer, the conflict is not merely structural or one of design; rather,
the clash is fed by the fact that the two regimes reflect different historical
considerations and collective roles or identities that are not necessarily
reconcilable. In this sense, it becomes essential to take account of the
values or social objectives underpinning the two regimes under examination in order to cast the ethos or driving logic of the two distributive
schemes in their proper context.
The U.S. Embargo Against Cuba-The design of a specific regime
for Cuba-originating IP rights is part of a general policy of curtailment
of a government deemed politically and ideologically undesirable by the
United States. But it goes beyond that. Through the embargo against
Cuba, the United States performs both a retributive form of justice and a
corrective one. The regime is based on the preexistence of a perceived
damage, a tort or a fault, originally committed by the Cuban government. In Nozickian terms, the embargo indirectly asserts the existence of
fundamental principles of acquisition and transfer, claims that the expropriation disregards such principles, and sets the principles for
rectification. The special IP regime is a response designed to protect specific property interests of U.S. nationals or Cuban nationals residing in
the United States, injured by a contested form of acquisition or transfer
of property rights. 22 The importance-likely measured in terms of identity and economic salience-for the United States of certain classes of
injured interests is reflected in their enjoyment of greater benefits under
the gradation of protection measures incorporated in the regime.'23 That
explains the gradation of protection retained for principle A in function
of the closeness of the interests at stake, measured by a sense of identity.
The original owners whose protection is sought, mainly U.S. nationals
and Cubans now residing in the United States, are rendered vulnerable
by the combination of the expropriation and the ability to exploit the expropriated rights through international mobility (trade) schemes. This
seems a plausible way to read the distinction drawn between original
owners and successors-in-interest and the policy of nonprotection attaching to the rights of the latter. Thus, the target of economic measures
taken therein has been expanded to foreign actors participating in business schemes involving Cuba-originating IP rights. As the court of
appeals in the Havana Club case put it:
Finding that the Castro government was "offering foreign investors the opportunity to purchase an equity interest in, manage, or
enter into joint ventures" involving confiscated property in order
122.
123.

Macaw, supra note 103, at 330-32.
See supra Section IV.B.
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to obtain "badly needed financial benefit, including hard currency, oil, and productive investment and expertise," 22 U.S.C.
§ 6081, (5), (6), Congress established a civil remedy for any
United States national owning a claim to "property" confiscated
by the Cuban government after January 1, 1959, against "any
person" who "traffics" in such property, id. § 6082 (a)(1)(A),
and broadly defined "property" specifically to include "trademarks," id. § 6023(12)(A). By doing so, Congress intended "to
create a 'chilling effect' that will deny the current Cuban regime
venture capital, discourage third-countrynationals from seeking
to profit from illegally confiscated property, and help preserve
such property until such time as the rightful owners can successfully assert their claim.' 24
The TRIPS Agreement-Contrary to the U.S. embargo against Cuba,
the TRIPS Agreement does not proceed from the logic of rectification. It
does not seek to correct or counter imbalances or injustices caused by
unfair methods of acquisition or transfers of goods. It does not really
seek to introduce an element of substantive correction in the current or
future distribution of IP rights.'25 To put it in more positive terms, the
TRIPS Agreement-like the embargo-is process-based in its design.
But whereas the concern with process of acquisition and transfer of the
embargo seems to take root in the past, the process of the TRIPS Agreement disregards the past and is geared toward the future. To use again the
Nozickian lexicon, the objective of the TRIPS Agreement is not to respond to past distribution, but to set up the terms of fair acquisition and
transfer.
The rationale for protection of IP rights depends on the characteristic
of the knowledge that is involved.'2 6 For instance, trademarks and marks
of origin allow product differentiation through the creation of brands and
thus provide information to consumers.' 27 However, those logics, even in
a fluid world, do not necessarily warrant that IP right protection should
be territorially expanded. The desire to entrench certain practices in order to protect and expand the wealth of the corporate citizens and the
technological edge of industrialized economies no doubt is the driving
force behind the TRIPS Agreement.' 21 It is therefore ironic that the clash
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between expansionist and protectionist regimes takes place in a dispute
in which the target of expansion is the United States, while it is obvious
that the vector of economic expansionism usually goes in the opposite
direction.
V.

EXPLOITING MOBILITY AND THE CONSTITUTION

OF A META-DISTRIBUTIVE SCHEME

In order to understand the prevalent rules among State actors
pertaining to the constitution, recognition, and enforcement (or denial
thereof) of international prerogatives linked to IP, it is undeniably helpful
to analyze the regimes as systems or structures of entrenched rules that
have come about through a form of socialization involving ideational and
material inputs. However, such an analysis presents a rather static (and
somewhat statist) picture of the relationships covered by the interplay of
both regimes. A more compelling and textured analysis needs to take
account of additional factors pertaining to the behavior of actors and
their unfixed character. In other words, it must integrate the following
dynamic that is inherent to the conduct of international business: as
highly mobile entities, corporations are capable of taking advantage of
variations in regimes (i.e., different zones of protection or creation of
higher or more profitable prerogatives). This allows for more attention to
the dialogically constitutive relation in which actors and structures interact.
While most States "derive [ ...their external authority from their
internal system," 2 9 the obverse phenomenon presides over the operations
of transnational corporations: they derive their internal (but nondomestic) prerogatives from the international system or from an
internationalized system made up of a number of regimes. Those multiple regimes often do not set a unified organized central distribution
(especially for private actors); rather, they compose a loose system encompassing a large number of subsystems. Within this structure,
Multilateral acceptance of enforceable ownership rights in intellectual property is
necessary because the industrialized countries strongly perceive a need to protect
their national wealth, not because natural law dictates protection, nor because such
protection in itself will yield economic and social benefits to developing countries.
Failure by the GATT to recognize and enforce such rights will only intensify pressures to achieve alternative solutions-through, for example, increased
industrialized country reliance on unilateral sanctions-that will most likely destabilize the liberal trading system.
Abbott, supra note 34, at 695; see also Durin & Michalopoulos, supra note 104, at 853.
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distribution will often be in flux and will often involve invoking one
scheme or another. As distributive schemes all have a constitutive or defining element linked to "community" or identity, capacity of mobility
from one community to another has become a key feature permitting
actors to play distributive schemes against each other. In other words,
zones of overlap, of mutual reinforcement, or of clash and antagonism
between regimes seem to be the zones more likely to be exploited by
actors who have the ability to move thereto in order to gain a stronger
legal prerogative or to obtain access to a more powerful or intrusive enforcement machinery. We should not assume that actors are static and are
simply "covered" or not by a legal regime. Quite the opposite, non-State
actors are mobile and can exploit their mobility not only to obtain a
more favorable distributive outcome over the rights that they claim, but
also to create new rights or claims to their advantage. The possibility of
altering one's position by moving within a plurality of distributive
schemes is not simply an element the outcome of which is to be taken
into account in applying the distributive principles of a regime; rather, it
can become a constitutive element of the dispute over which regime governs.
In that sense, there is a two-level distributive game. On the first
level, actors are recognized (or not) as allowed to participate in the allocation of goods under given distributive schemes and are able (or not) to
secure goods under that scheme. This may create "pressure for change
aris[ing] from the dissatisfaction of some actors or class of actors with
the distributive consequences of a prevailing regime." 3 ° Given the coexistence of various more or less overlapping distributive schemes, actors
dissatisfied with their share of goods have the option and ability, rather
than to challenge a regime internally, to move so as to fall into the zone
of application of a regime more favorable to them or susceptible of
trumping the other regime. It is, in essence, a process similar to forum
shopping. That second-level distributive game, when it is available, is
thus an actor-led self-selection of a distributive scheme. Functionally
speaking, the opening of possibilities through such type of mobility itself
operates as a distributive scheme. It is a form of distribution, although
not centralized, of schemes distributing more concrete IP rights.
To put it in the context of the regimes studied in this Article, the
strategy for actors who want to maximize their possibilities of using
Cuba-originating IP rights is to move from a zone of curtailment of their
prerogatives to a zone of enforcement or protection of prerogatives they
can claim. For instance, a Cuban original owner residing in Cuba ((2)(c))
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seeking to enforce an IP right created domestically will gain better enforcement possibilities by moving to a foreign country ((2)(b)), and
possibilities that are better still by moving to the United States ((2)(a)).
The United States has sought to bar transactions between Cuban original
owners and foreign corporations by not authorizing transfers (unless the
express consent of the original owner is granted) and by always denying
enforcement possibilities to foreign successors-in-interest. Given the
possibility for U.S. corporations to become successors-in-interest by way
of a specific license, the advantage of mobility is curtailed in all but one
direction. The vectoral dimension resulting from such construction is
therefore rather clear.
That scheme could not, however, counter an external challenge such
as one taking place before the Dispute Settlement Body of the WTO. By
moving from Cuba to an economically powerful State-and member of
the WTO-IP rights are transferred to a zone in which enforcement
possibilities are stronger, and in which arguments of national defense do
not hold water (because it is a secondary boycott). For the European
Communities, strongly opposed to the measures in Title III of the
Helms-Burton Act,' challenging a cousin-measure under international
trade law is a golden opportunity to take action on its discontentment
with Washington's policies on Cuba and to obtain enhanced protection
for the investments of its corporate citizens in Cuba. Here, the interests
of European corporations, of the European leaders, and of the Cuban
government converge.
If the United States wishes to comply with the request of the Appellate Body, it must now either prevent any transfer of Cuba-originating IP
rights, or permit such transfers under certain conditions to which both
U.S. and foreign corporations would be subject. If some transfers are
permitted, the same consequences in terms of IP enforcement possibilities must be attached to all successors-in-interest, U.S. or foreign. Thus
foreign corporations will either gain certain limited prerogatives in the
United States attached to their IP rights, or obtain that U.S. competitors
be subjected to the same measures. In both ways, what is at stake is the
leveling of the playing field.'32 In distributive terms, the mobility of
rights has been used to trigger a mechanism-that of the WTO Dispute
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Another way for foreign corporations to obtain some form of protection in the
United States while doing business with Cuba could be to register in the United States a
trademark similar to a Cuban one (without contending that it results from a transfer), then
exploit it by producing equivalent goods outside Cuba and exporting them to the United
States, and finally sign with its Cuban partner a pact of "future merger" of the Cuban and the
U.S. trademarks (for when the embargo will be lifted). This technique would preserve the
future exploitation of Cuba-originating IP rights in the United States by a Cuban or foreign
corporation.

Spring 2003]

Assessing Clashes and Interplays

Settlement Body, to which the United States is attached given the gains
that it derives from it-able to challenge a protectionist definition of the
community of distribution.
VI. CONCLUSION

The interaction between the rules set up in the U.S. embargo against
Cuba and the TRIPS Agreement is an important issue for Cuba. On the
eve of a change of regime likely to lead to a modification of its
socioeconomic structure, the battle for the control of the post-socialist
economy of the island and for its eventual integration into the global
liberal economy is well under way. Meanwhile, for Cuba itself, lessening
the stringency of the economic measures taken by the U.S. government
toward itself and its economic partner is an important objective. With
very little technology, and apart from tourism and sugar, Cuba's
economy rests on very few products, some of which are of great
reputation. Among them is Cuban rum, but one can also think of its
famous cigars for 33which a similar battle is taking place around the
Cohiba trademark. 1
The clash under study shows that the design of rules and regulatory
schemes, as well as the behavior of actors within those schemes, cannot
be reduced to considerations of best practices. In that sense, it is a truism
that the clash results from conflicting pressures between those who want
to consolidate or improve their situation through the continued application of principles that served them well and those who want to improve
their situation through new rules. Regime creation is in a sense always a
form of reaction vis-A-vis a prevailing situation.
In a context of partially overlapping regimes, we must also pay heed
to the strategic behavior of actors able to formulate claims under those
regimes. A regulatory scheme can be considered an environment whose
constraints shape behavior and expectations. When, as part of the environment, there are various schemes that impose different types of
constraints, actors will often seek to exploit the disparities to their
advantage. Given the multiplication of actors, norms, and regulatory
frameworks, the international society is likely to be the theater of an increasing load of challenges articulated around the proper principles of
definition of the community of distribution.
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In that sense, celebrating the decision of the Appellate Body as the
34
triumph and strengthening of a universal and universalizing rule of law
camouflages the reasons why breaking the protectionist policy of the
United States was desirable, given that the decision equally pleased both
apostles of a universal liberal economy and opponents of specific U.S.
policies toward Cuba. For those who condone undermining the anachronistic Cuban embargo while remaining concerned with maintaining the
possibility of creating non-universal distributive schemes and forms of
protection of historically rooted peculiarities, the decision might end up
being a mixed blessing. In terms of precedential value, there is indeed a
danger to overfocus on the universalizing spin of the Section 211 decision and to end up condemning particularistic policies that would be
defendable given a different distribution of economic power, notably in a
situation of serious structural vulnerability to economic penetration. Disregarding the vectoral dimension of economic regimes-manifested in
dominant flows of actors and rights-by using the veil of universalism
would be, in the given context of growing global inequalities, nothing
short of irresponsible.
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